In software engineering, the magic triangle is a well-known concept to illustrate the relationship between scope, time, and cost of a software development project. Of the three (scope, time, cost), pick two, and the third will magically follow. (It is determined by the other two.) Scope means features (or delivered functionality), time means duration or deadline, and cost typically means number of developers or, more abstractly, available labor.Continue reading “Agile Methods and the Magic Triangle”
Open Source Expanded is the name of a new column (open-ended article series) that I’m editing for IEEE Computer Magazine. Expect a new article on open source and how it is changing the world every two months!
The first article on the innovations of open source was just published, kicking of the column. I could not negotiate an open license, however, all articles will be free to read and download.Continue reading “Open Source Expanded (New Column)”
The house magazine of IAV Automotive Engineering GmbH, a major supplier to the German automotive industry, which had interviewed Markus Blonn and me about open source and inner source at IAV, translated the magazine article into English, woohoo!
In tech companies, startups and large companies alike, of the many roles you need to define, two seem to be particularly confusing to German startups: The CTO and the VP of Engineering role. Many German startups I’ve seen simply have a person titled CTO who does both (and sometimes neither). These two roles are very different! They require different skill sets and while temporarily one person may be able to fill both shoes, longer term they are better filled by two different people. In more detail:Continue reading “CTO vs. VP of Engineering”
Yesterday, I discussed what makes a good pilot project in inner source. The main thrust of the suggestion was not to start with a big bang but rather to choose a relevant but not too large project. This begs the question of complexity of projects, specifically viewed from an inner source perspective. How should you escalate and grow your ambition for inner source projects? I see a 1 + 3 structure of levels.Continue reading “Escalating Levels of Complexity in Inner Source Projects”
I received several requests recently for my inner source charter document to provide it in DOC format, after I thought this work had fallen dormant (or perhaps the PDF version was sufficient). So I wanted to add my thoughts on how to take first steps in inner source, in particular in the selection of a pilot project.Continue reading “Getting Started With Inner Source”
I have a strong aversion against letting people drag their feet from being responsible for their actions. I feel particularly strongly about this when delegating work to machines, which are not able to act using an appropriate moral value system. Starting a car and letting an autonomous driving unit take over is one such example: When faced with an impossible situation (run over an old lady or three children or commit suicide), it still has to be the driver’s decision and not a machine’s.
Ever since autonomous driving became a hot topic, I’ve tried to sell to our automotive industry partners the idea of a project to build a moral machine in autonomous driving. My definition of a moral machine (there are others) is:
I just helped finish three AMOS projects, all with IAV Engineering, at TU Berlin (Prof. Schieferdecker). Below, please find the project summaries for the projects:
- FlyInn (a multi-modal app to manage a large array of embedded devices),
- Corridor Navigation (an app to provide multi-path navigation suggestions), and
- Adrenaline (an app for the motorbiking community to connect and share.
I just finished reading John Carreyrou’s book Bad Blood, which presents the story of the rise and fall of one-time Silicon Valley unicorn Theranos through his eyes as the journalist who broke the story. In case you missed it: Theranos was a healthcare company promising to sell a machine that could perform quickly and reliably a large number of blood tests needed by medical doctors to aid their patient care. The hitch: The technology never worked and Theranos managed to hide this from investors and the public for a long time.